LSAG significantly underestimates strangelet production by applying thermal model incorrectly .. anyone can see if they can prove me wrong.

"I had expected that similar, or much greater numbers of undisruptible dibaryon would have emerged from cosmic rays. But I can see that, like with strangelets, the production of these particularly closely bound quark systems could well only be possible in the central qgp where the quark density is already far higher than with ordinary nuclei or from the non qgp parts of the ion ion collisions."

Hello Eric,

thank you for your thorough investigation. I have a question to the issue above: Why are you not just transforming the fixed targed system and the central of mass system intoeach other ? Doing this you can apply Jaffe et al., section D (page 21ff) and use the estimations for the moon.

I am very interested in this issue, but as I am likely offline for 2 weeks I can continue only afterwards.


Best regards, Ralf

I did. This is because Jaffe et al. do accept the disruptible strangelet argument if all strangelets are emitted within central rapidity range. By this is meant zero velocity range in the frame of reference of the centre of mass of the collision system. This is why central rapidity at moon is fast moving while at RHIC or LHC is at rest.

Eric

Im Zusammenhang mit dem Beitrag von Herrn Penrose ist die Feststellung wichtig:

1.) Aus quantentheoretischer und stringtheoretischer Sicht wird seitens Gidding und Mangano (CERN) k e i n e ausreichende Sicherheit begründet.

2.) Giddings und Mangano (CERN) weichen daher eingestandenermaßen auf astronomisch begründete Argumentationen aus.

3.) In der Facharbeit von Giddings und Mangano werden die Ergebnisse von Tegmark und Bostrom n i c h t erwähnt, welche auf Basis anderen astronomischen Datenmaterials (Auswertungen Lineweaver et al.) ein Risiko nicht ausschliessen, sondern ein "jährliches Risiko" mit einer Risikoobergrenze angeben.

4.) Ferner wird bei Giddings und Mangano das Phänomen der "Missing stars" (79 dokumentierte Einzelfälle existieren) n i c h t erwähnt.

Der Beitrag von Mr. Penrose verschärft die vorhandenen Unvollständigkeiten der vorliegenden offiziellen Risikoanalysen und hat offenbar das Ziel, ein Risiko bereits aus bestimmten quantentheoretischen Erwägungen heraus zu verdeutlichen.

Rudolf
Thankyou, I agree that the original, or your application of Bostrom et al'selection effect' should be taken into account with astrophysical assurance arguments; though I think it should be remembered they are based themselves on questionable arguments - they ignore Plaga, and two safety reviews of strangelets (A Kent, F Calogero), the argument of this blog etc.

But I saw a tv science program recently where an infinitely extensive universe was discussed as feasible (I don't remember which theorists). In that case, due to the infinite possibilites of unlikely situations, it seems to me clear that the selection effect makes these astrophysical arguments to be inapplicable.

Eric

Hello Eric,

thank you for your explanation. Before I can continue I need to doublecheck whether this issue is already considered in Jaffe et al. and Dar et al.

As this seems to be an interesting issue I recommend to involve a particle physician as well for an assessment.


Maybe you have read that I am on holiday now for 2 weeks and I do not know if I am online in this time.


Best regards, Ralf

Ralph
'I recommend to involve a particle physician as well for an assessment.'

If you know someone who is, to be involved, that would certainly help. Enjoy the holiday.

Eric

Hello Eric,

I refer to the argumentation of Jaffe et al., page 24; bold emphasized by me, not by the authors:

"For a representative dangerous strangelet, e.g. A = 20, Z = −1, the suppression factor in eq. (16) is very large, P(y, 20,−1) = exp[−350(cosh y − 1)], so only strangelets with y ≈ 0 survive. For the rapidity distribution, eq. (14), chosen by DDH, all dangerous strangelets produced at RHIC would survive stopping, but no strangelet would survive stopping on the moon. The more realistic production mechanism of eq. (13) yields lunar suppression factors of 3 × 10^(−3), 10^(−4), 2 × 10^(−6), and 5 × 10^(−8) when the parameter a (which controls the small y behavior of dN/dy) is chosen as 1, 2, 3 and 4. However this mechanism also reduces the probability that a strangelet produced at RHIC will survive the stopping process. The survival probabilities are 8 × 10^(−3), 8 × 10^(−3), 10^(−2), and 2 × 10^(−2), for a = 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively. Thus the effective lunar suppression factors are: an enhancement of 3 for a = 1, no suppression for a = 2, suppression by 2 × 10^(−4) for a = 3, and by 3 × 10^(−6) for a = 4. Choosing a suppression factor of 10^(−6) we obtain survival probabilities of 10^22p for Case I (iron-iron at AGS energies), 2×10^16p for Case II (iron-iron at RHIC energies), 10^17p for Case III (“gold”-iron at AGS energies), and 2×10^11p for Case IV (“gold”-iron at RHIC energies)."


Thus the case mentioned by you is regarded in Jaffe et al.; by the way not only in the sectioned quoted by me above. Thus it is required to have a further look at this issue, i.e. in which equation or assumption of Jaffe et al. something may have been overlooked; currently I do not see any wrong assumption or overlooked issue.


Best regards, Ralf

Ralph

Can I say that I don't think you are careful to concern yourself with what my arguments actually are? Either you continually avoid the question of contradiction between Jaffe et al. and Dar et al. or you insist that if there is a phyisicist that argues something for safety, they are right and any doubt about it is implicitly wrong - even if other physicists doubt the reliability of that argument. In particular, Dr A Kent in 2000, indicates that Jaffe et al.s formula for strangelet production mechanism and survivability is unverified/doubtful and the parameter values that give low statistical risk for their preferred Case I, though unknown, are set within convenient value ranges.

I suggest you ask yourself why you prefer these arguments and not the doubts, and furthermore why it is that both Jaffe etal and yourself here, are concerned to list their doubted cases 3 and 4 even though they themselves indicate no safety reassurance whatsoever. Does this not mean that, 'at the end of the day', they have doubts about the safety certainty themselves? Why would they calculate and present these statistics if they believe them to be already conclusively wrong?

Eric

"what my arguments actually are?"

Hello Eric,

I understand your impression, but that is not my point: My point is, that it is not making much sense to spend time with "general doubts"; it is much more efficient to elaborate the contradiction to the safety analyses. If there is at least one open issue it is possible to address the wrong formula. This is currently not the case.


"avoid the question of contradiction between Jaffe et al. and Dar et al."

I cannot remember that there is such a contradiction, but maybe my memory is wrong. Could you please tell the reading public and me, regarding which issue there is a contradiction between Jaffe et al. and Dar et al. ?


I think the other questions should be answered after your reply to my questions above.


Best regards, Ralf

Ralf

I cannot now believe you are being other than disengenious - you have failed to follow up the contradiction of astrophysical assurance between Jaffe et al. and Dar et al. that you had promised - even after I recently gave the relevant page number - and you are not prepared to consider any arguments that in any way differ from pro safety ones -even if by a theoretical physicist such as Kent.

For this reason, I now withdraw from further time wasting communication with you.

Eric

As you wish, Sir.

We already had this debate before, I have now looked for this - this was in this thread: http://www.achtphasen.net/index.php/2010/03/22/p1595, e.g. 24.3.2010, 08:54 and 25.3.2010, 13:09. My memory was as expected not wrong.

That you added a further contribution there some days ago is nice, but this website does not provide any tools to show this so I have seen this reply only now.

The link does not work, but I have it in a printed version. Before you claimed that Dar contradicts to Wilczek, now you claim, that Wilczek (correct were: Jaffe) contradicts to Dar. From a safety point of view both is inaccurate as the so called "contradiction" happens before the new derivation. For details please see my response there.


Back to this thread: Until now you have neither been able to indicate a wrong formula nor a missing assumption in the safety analyses - this already for months. I do not know why you refuse to provide this, but I assume you will have your reasons for that.


I wish you all the best for your future and strongly recommend to use the official scientific processes for inputting your ideas. If you want to continue this discussion, please feel free and open a thread in http://www.relativ-kritisch.net/forum/viewforum.php?f=46.


Ralf Kannenberg

Continually having to deal with what emerges as intentional efforts of procrastination by Ralf Kannenberg, Eric Penrose will no longer respond to him.

However this is a post version of an email responding to Mr. Kannenberg's now published last post above:
----------

http://samshah0.tripod.com/STS_Thesis.pdf


EXCERPTS:
---
But the question that is raised, and that Jaffe feels was violated by
Dar and his colleagues, is where does one draw the line for a worst case
assumption? His disdain for these assumptions was made clear in an
interview:

"Dar, De Rujula, and Heinz had an idea that they wanted to play with
about how strangelets would have behaved in the early history of the
universe, and like many of my theory colleagues, they were infatuated
with their idea. Their idea provided no useful information if our
assumptions about strangelet products were correct, so they wrote a
paper in which they assumed very unlikely ad hoc mechanisms, things that
most scientists who know the subject would consider outrageous. But if
you make that assumption, then the bounds that we derived evaporated,
and that opened the door for the bounds that they were interested in
discussing to become the operative bounds."

In other words, Jaffe saw his research as being undermined by the
Geneva-based physicists. More than that, he saw the CERN paper as an
opening for reporters to latch on to the notion that the Brookhaven
report had credible physicists disagreeing with it:

"people like Wagner... they latched on to the Dar, De Rejula, and Heinz
paper and said “look legitimate scientists disagree with your
premises.” Furthermore, it turns out that Dar De Rejula, and Heinz’s
idea has a flaw in it, a rather obvious flaw, so their proposed limit is
not valid. So if you believed everything that you see in the literature,
they demolished our limit and then we demolished their limit, and so Mr.
Wagner can say “look there are no limits."

To Jaffe, the scientific community was not putting on a face of
solidarity in a time when public opinion was questioning the validity
and safety of its work. The scientific accuracy of the articles was
not the only concern Jaffe held; his concern was of scientists
themselves providing the ammunition to those attempting to put a
metaphorical cog in the RHIC experiment.

...

But even with the scientific community somewhat worried about the
negative publicity, debates took place about the actual science behind
the risk analysis of the disaster scenarios – namely between the
investigative committee (Jaffe, Busza, Sandweiss, and Wilczek) and a
group based in Geneva (Dar, De Rujula, and Heinz). The major concern
that Jaffe had over the debate, perhaps even overriding his concern with
the correctness of the scientific analysis, was the breach the differing
analysis provided, which reporters could exploit – the scientific
disunification which gave credibility to the notion that scientists do
not know how to understand the Brookhaven risk completely.

...

With the media frenzy that followed, the Brookhaven National Laboratory
was receiving negative attention from the public. John Marburger, the
director of BNL at the time, had been in communication with Robert
Jaffe, the director of the Center for Theoretical Physics at MIT. Jaffe
said:

I was giving advice to Marburger in conversations on the telephone... So
in the spring of 1999 I was talking to Jack [Marburger] a few times
trying to help give him scientific advice for dealing with conversations
with people like Walter Wagner... And then in the early summer, he asked
me if I would chair a committee that would do a more formal review.

Besides selecting Jaffe, a pioneer in the theory of strange matter, as
head of the committee, Marburger also asked Frank Wilczek, Wit Busza,
and Jack Sandweiss to serve as members. Wilczek, a theorist, was chosen
by Jaffe and Marburger to “pay the wages of his sin since he’s the
one that started this all with his letter,” while Sandweiss and Busza
were experimenters who were chosen because they were “very
responsible, thoughtful, contributing members of the community who
[took] the time to work on this because they have such a deep respect
for Brookhaven.”

The committee communicated in groups of twos and threes, mainly on the
telephone. Wilczek and Jaffe were in charge of the calculations, which
were then checked by experimentalists Busza and Sandweiss (who, in
addition, provided practical estimates). There was mainly agreement on
the work done in the committee, according to Jaffe, and a general
attitude of bemusement at the topic being worked on. As Jaffe explained
in an interview, “No scientist who understood the physics thought that
this experiment posed the slightest threat to anybody.”

---

So why did Leake pick up this story? And how did he go about researching
it? Leake stated that what prompted the story was “Brookhaven’s
decision to set up a committee to investigate the risk – and then to
lie about its existence.”The committee that Leake referred to was a
group of four physicists called by John Marburger, director of the
Brookhaven National Laboratory, to study the experiment’s potential
for catastrophic consequences. Leake expounded:

"I spoke to John Marburger... and he said that the lab was not at all
concerned about the risk and was taking no action. Then I spoke to Bob
Jaffe who had just received a letter from Brookhaven asking him to serve
on the committee assessing the risk. I went back to Marburger who then
admitted to the committee’s existence and said it had ‘not been
important’ to tell me. I think an internationally renowned laboratory
calling in some of the world’s best physicists to sit on a committee
deciding if an experiment could go so badly wrong is a very valid story
– especially when they cover up their actions."

---

The article itself presented a serious group of scientists investigating
credible disaster scenarios – scenarios with a “real risk.”
However, this conflicts greatly with Robert Jaffe’s explanation of the
risk. Jaffe (Director of MIT’s Center for Theoretical Physics) was
appointed head of the investigative committee comprised of four people.
He stated that even before he was asked to serve on the committee that
“No scientist who understood the physics thought that this experiment
posed the slightest threat to anybody.” I asked Jaffe that if the
threats were not credible, then why have the committee in the first
place? He replied that “it was an attempt to take seriously the fears
of science that they [the public] don’t understand, and to try to
provide them some reassurance that things they don’t understand are
not being controlled by a conspiracy.” Ironically, it was this fear of
conspiracy (of Marburger’s “cover up”) that led for the Sunday
Times (London) article to be drafted in the first place.

---

In contrast, the Brookhaven report was written both for physicists and
the general public. The technical version of the report, for the expert
audience, was written and published in the Reviews of Modern Physics
later. The Brookhaven report was written to be a convincing reply to
Walter Wagner and the unbridled media frenzy:

"I think [the report] was an attempt to take seriously the fears of
science that they [the public] don’t understand, and to try to provide
them some reassurance that things they don’t understand are not being
controlled by a conspiracy."

To put it another way, the Brookhaven report was used partially to allay
public fears about the abuse of modern science and technology.